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In social decision-making, people care both about
others’ outcomes and their intentions to help or
harm. How the brain integrates representations of
others’ intentions with their outcomes, however, is
unknown. In this study, participants inferred others’
decisions in an economic game during functional
magnetic resonance imaging. When the game was
described in terms of donations, ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (VMPFC) activation increased for infer-
ring generous play and decreased for inferring selfish
play. When the game was described in terms of
individual savings, however, VMPFC activation did
not distinguish between strategies. Distinct medial
prefrontal regions also encoded consistency with
situational norms. A separate network, including
right temporoparietal junction and parahippocampal
gyrus, was more activated for inferential errors in the
donation than in the savings condition. These results
demonstrate that neural responses to others’ gener-
osity or selfishness depend not only on their actions
but also on their perceived intentions.
INTRODUCTION
People often have to evaluate others’ decisions, for instance, to
decide whether a car seller’s offered price is fair, or to arbitrate
between an employer and employee in a wage conflict. In these
evaluations, people generally care about outcomes, such as
how much money is at stake or how much each party earns,
but also about intentions, such as whether the seller is honest
or the employer is negotiating fairly. Participants in economic
games, for example, will sacrifice their own monetary payoffs
to punish selfish players or reward generous players (de Quer-
vain et al., 2004; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Fischbacher et al.,
2001). These evaluations are commonly analyzed with reci-
procity-based theories of social decision-making (Falk and
Fischbacher, 2005; Frank, 1988; Sobel, 2005). Reciprocity-
based theories propose formal models of preferences about
others’ outcomes, or ‘‘social preferences,’’ in which people
prefer rewards for others with helpful intentions and punish-
ments for others with harmful intentions.These theories generally assume that others’ intentions are
judged by observing past actions, such as how the seller has
treated other buyers or how the employer has negotiated before.
Judgments based on others’ actions, however, can be biased
by a range of individual and situational factors, such as the
observer’s personality, the stereotypes he or she holds, or
what other information is provided (Kelley, 1973; Marston, 1976).
If participants in similar economic games, for example, are given
different intentions for the other players (that they are compelled
by the experimenter, or by chance), then the same selfish or
generous actions are judged less harshly or kindly (Garrett and
Libby, 1973; Singer et al., 2004).
Neural correlates of social preferences are likely to reflect both
others’ objective outcomes and their perceived intentions. The
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) is one good candidate
among neural structures that might represent social prefer-
ences. The medial PFC is important for a wide range of social
cognitive tasks and social behaviors, and different regions
seem to encode different components of social cognitive pro-
cessing (Amodio and Frith, 2006). In particular, VMPFC activa-
tion correlates both with preferences for tangible personal
outcomes (like money or food) and for social outcomes (like
viewing attractive others or discovering that another person likes
you) across a wide range of incentives and tasks (Chib et al.,
2009; Davey et al., 2010; Knutson et al., 2005; Knutson and
Wimmer, 2007; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Plassmann et al., 2007;
Somerville et al., 2006). The VMPFC also plays a critical role in
social cognition and empathy more broadly (Adolphs, 2009;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009), which suggests that it may be
engagedwhen people consider others’ outcomes aswell as their
own (Lieberman, 2007).
To test whether VMPFC activation reflects both others’
outcomes and their intentions, we examined participants in
an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging
(FMRI) study, as well as a separate behavioral study, while
they observed other people playing a repeated public goods
game (Ledyard, 1995) framed with one of two different descrip-
tions (Figure 1). In both versions of the observed game, each
player on each trial decided how much of a $10 endowment to
contribute to a group investment, which was then doubled and
split equally between players. The game presents a tension
between contributing, which benefits the group, and not contrib-
uting, which benefits the individual player. In the ‘‘Donation’’
condition, the game was described in terms of donations and
the group consequences of generous or selfish play. This
description was designed to evoke emotional responses toNeuron 67, 511–521, August 12, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 511
Figure 1. Timeline for a Single Trial
Participants observed and made inferences about other players in a repeated
public goods game. Participants did not play themselves and had no personal
monetary stake in the game. In the observed game, each player on each trial
decided how much of a $10 endowment to contribute to a group investment
that was then doubled and split equally between players on that trial.
On each trial, participants first saw the four players for that round (face phase,
8 s), then inferred whether their contributions would total $20 or more (‘‘High’’)
or less than $20 (‘‘Low’’; inference phase, 3-5 s). Each player’s actual contribu-
tion was then displayed under her face, along with the total contribution and
the correct outcome (feedback phase, 5 s). A Donation-condition trial is shown;
the Savings condition was identical except all inferences and feedback were
in terms of savings ($10 – the contribution amount) rather than contributions.
Neuron
VMPFC Activation for Others’ Intentionsplayers’ actions, and to highlight players’ helpful or harmful
intentions toward others (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Frank,
1988). In the ‘‘Savings’’ condition, the game was described in
terms of personal savings and the individual consequences of
risky or prudent play. This kind of description reduces personal
contributions in the public goods game and related social
dilemmas (Andreoni, 1995; Liberman et al., 2004) and was
designed to minimize emotional judgments about players’ inten-
tions toward others.
In both conditions, participants on each trial inferred how
much they expected the group of players to contribute (in the
Donation condition) or save (in the Savings condition). Next,
they saw each player’s actual contribution amount. In the Dona-
tion condition, ‘‘High’’ (compared with ‘‘Low’’) inferences corre-
sponded to high contributions and hence larger monetary
outcomes for the group; in the Savings condition, ‘‘High’’ infer-
ences corresponded to high individual savings and hence larger
monetary outcomes for some individual players but not the512 Neuron 67, 511–521, August 12, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.group. The objective monetary outcomes were identical across
conditions, and participants had no personal monetary stake in
the game in either condition. The effect of the task descriptions
on players’ perceived intentions was measured by examining
changes in liking for players (in the FMRI study) and interpersonal
perceptions of players (in the behavioral study). If the different
descriptions suggested different intentions behind the same
observed actions, then participants should report increased
liking for generous players and decreased liking for selfish
players in the Donation condition, but not in the Savings
condition.
Although we examined activation across the whole brain, our
key hypotheses related to activation in the VMPFC. Evaluating
others’ decisions might recruit the VMPFC in three possible
ways. First, the VMPFC might represent only the value of
personal outcomes. In this case, its activation should not distin-
guish between any observed outcomes, since participants had
no personal stake in the game. Second, the VMPFC might
‘‘simulate’’ the objective value of others’ outcomes regardless
of how they are described. In this case, since the observed
monetary payoffs were identical between conditions, any
VMPFC activation should be also identical between conditions.
Finally, VMPFC activation might reflect preferences about
others’ outcomes that incorporate their perceived intentions.
In this case, its activation should represent the value of players’
contributions in the Donation condition (when those contribu-
tions affected players’ perceived intentions to help or harm
others), but not in the Savings condition (when they did not).RESULTS
Note
For consistency, results are described in terms of contributions.
Contributions match the numbers that participants in the Dona-
tion condition saw but are reversed from what participants in
the Savings condition saw (for example, an $8 contribution
was seen as a $2 savings). When describing inferences, how-
ever, we retain the original framing, to match the words that all
participants saw. Results associated with High (versus Low)
inferences in the Donation condition are thus associated with
contributions of $20 or more, while results associated with
High (versus Low) inferences in the Savings condition are asso-
ciated with savings of $20 or more.Behavior (FMRI Study)
Performance was measured as the percentage of correct infer-
ences, averaged over blocks of 15 trials within conditions.
Correct inferences increased over time, and did not differ
between conditions (Table 1). Performance was above chance
for all blocks; the worst performance was 59.63% correct in
the first block of the Savings condition (t[17] = 2.57, p = 0.02).
Polynomial contrasts indicated only a significant linear effect
(F[1, 36] = 10.28, p = 0.003). There was no main effect of condi-
tion (F[1, 36] = 0.004, p = 0.95) or interaction between condition
and time (F[3, 108] = 0.09, p = 0.97). Performance reached an
identical plateau in both conditions of about two-thirds correct.
For comparison, a participant with perfect knowledge of all
Table 1. Performance and Reaction Time
Block of Trials % Correct (SEM) Reaction Time, ms (SEM)
Donation Savings Donation Savings
First 59.67 (2.34) 59.63 (3.75) 1095.38 (48.93) 1161.97 (67.82)
Second 62.67 (2.96) 63.70 (2.10) 970.01 (42.16) 1051.15 (61.37)
Third 68.67 (1.82) 67.04 (2.32) 987.84 (48.92) 1026.48 (69.32)
Fourth 68.00 (3.08) 68.15 (2.32) 930.07 (44.31) 1105.13 (70.67)
n = 38 (20 in Donation condition, 18 in Savings condition). Blocks are 15 trials long. Standard errors of the mean (SEM) are calculated within block and
condition. See also Table S1 online.
Figure 2. Estimated Contribution Predicts Liking in the Donation but
Not in the Savings Condition
Points represent liking change from before to after the task for each player,
plotted against the estimated average contribution for that player. Participants
in the Savings condition saw savings amounts ($10 – contributions); contribu-
tions are displayed here for clarity. Error bars are standard errors across partic-
ipants. See also Figure S1 online for changes in interpersonal ratings.
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VMPFC Activation for Others’ Intentionsplayers’ strategies could have been correct on 76% of trials, due
to the probabilistic nature of the task.
Reaction time (averaged over blocks of 15 trials) declined over
time, but also did not differ between conditions (Table 1). Polyno-
mial contrasts indicated both linear (F[1, 36] = 8.65, p = 0.006)
and quadratic (F[1, 36] = 5.47, p = 0.025) effects, such that the
speeding of reaction time declined over blocks. There was no
main effect of condition (F[1, 36] = 2.17, p = 0.15) or interaction
between condition and time (F[3, 108] = 1.69, p = 0.17), indi-
cating that participants spent similar amounts of time making
inferences between conditions.
To assess explicit learning, players’ actual average contribu-
tions were used to predict participants’ posttask estimates,
using a mixed linear model (MLM) with actual contribution,
condition, and their interaction as predictors. Perfect learning
would correspond to an average estimate (i.e., model intercept)
of $5 and an actual contribution slope of $1. Participants made
highly accurate estimates of average contributions. Actual con-
tribution significantly predicted estimated contribution (F[1,
228] = 458.79, p < 0.001), and the model intercept of $4.90 did
not differ significantly from $5.00 (95% confidence interval [CI]:
$4.68–$5.09). The actual contribution slope was $0.88, sig-
nificantly less than $1 (95% CI: $0.80–$0.96), indicating that
participants tended to overestimate low contributions and
underestimate high contributions. Condition had no main effect
or interaction (main effect: F[1, 228] = 0.03, p = 0.85; interac-
tion: F[1, 228] = 1.37, p = 0.24). Participants therefore made simi-
larly accurate estimates of numerical contributions in both
conditions.
Participants inferred High slightly more often than Low, but
this bias did not differ between conditions (mean High in
Donation = 56.33%, SEM = 1.67%; mean High in Savings =
55.00%, SEM = 2.10%; t[36] = 0.50, p = 0.62). Reaction times
were also faster for High than Low inferences by about 70 ms
(High M = 1018.34, SEM = 35.08; Low M = 1084.60, SEM =
37.51; F[1, 36] = 10.00, p = 0.003), but this advantage did not
differ by condition (F[1, 36] = 0.94, p = 0.34). High and Low
inferences and reaction times were thus comparable across
conditions.
Participants were asked how much they themselves would
have contributed if they had played (framed either as a question
about donating or saving). Participants’ own hypothetical con-
tributions were significantly higher in the Donation condition
(M = $5.85, SEM= 0.43) than in the Savings condition (M = $3.56,
SEM = 0.53; t[36] = 3.40, p = 0.002), suggesting participants
viewed contributions more favorably in the Donation condition.Next, to test how observed contributions and the task descrip-
tions influenced players’ perceived intentions, changes in liking
for players were predicted using an MLM with estimated contri-
bution, condition, and their interaction as predictors (including
initial liking and the quadratic and random effects of estimated
contribution as covariates of no interest). We hypothesized that
estimated contribution would increase liking in the Donation
condition, but that this effect would be reduced in the Savings
condition.
Both hypotheses were supported (Figure 2). In the Donation
condition, high contributors were liked and low contributors
were disliked (F[1, 37.05] = 34.07, p < 0.001). This effect was
symmetrical for high and low contributors, such that average
liking across players did not differ from zero (F[1, 37.75] = 1.27,
p = 0.27). The effect was qualified by a significant interaction
with condition (F[1, 36.60] = 10.82, p = 0.002), reflecting a
reduced effect of estimated contribution on liking in the Savings
condition. There was no main effect of condition (F[1, 37.93] =
2.53, p = 0.12), indicating that participants did not differ between
conditions in their average liking across players.
Behavioral Study
Participants in the behavioral study performed the same task as
FMRI participants, again in either the Donation or Savings condi-
tion. Accuracy and reaction time were similar to the FMRI studyNeuron 67, 511–521, August 12, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 513
Figure 3. Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Is Selectively Activated for
High Inferences in the Donation Condition
(A) Activation for High versus Low inferences, greater for Donation than
Savings condition. Color bar indicates t-statistic. Activations thresholded vox-
elwise at p < 0.001 with a ten-voxel extent minimum for display.
(B) Time course of activation from 8 mm spherical region of interest centered
on VMPFC functional peak, beginning at inference-phase onset. Error bars are
standard errors across participants.
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VMPFC Activation for Others’ Intentions(see Table S1), and participants were again highly accurate in
their explicit learning in both conditions (actual contribution
effect on estimated contribution: F[1, 504] = 711.62, p < 0.001;
interaction with condition: F[1, 504] = 0.29, p = 0.59). As well,
participants’ own hypothetical contributions were again higher
in the Donation (M = $5.83, SEM = 0.33) than in the Savings
condition (M = $2.81, SEM = 0.28; t[82] = 6.90, p < 0.001). The
effect of players’ estimated contribution on liking for players
was also replicated. Participants liked high contributors and
disliked low contributors in the Donation condition (main effect
of estimated contribution: F[1, 86.68] = 76.82, p < 0.001), but
this effect was significantly reduced in the Savings condition
(interaction: F[1, 84.98] = 39.76, p < 0.001). There was again
no main effect of condition on liking (F[1, 81.58] = 0.68, p = 0.41).
To examine how interpersonal perceptions might be con-
nected to liking, we also asked participants to judge players’
interpersonal traits before and after the task, specifically, their
dominance and their friendliness. One interpretation of the task
condition’s effect on liking might be that participants in the
Savings condition saw players’ contributions as purely individual
decisions, unconnected to a social group. Differences in VMPFC
activation between conditions might then be due to differences
in ‘‘how social’’ the situation was perceived to be (Harris et al.,
2007). If the Savings condition changed whether players’ contri-
butions were perceived to have social meaning at all, then this
condition should also decrease whether contributions affected
any interpersonal traits.
Instead, however, the effect of task condition was selective for
perceived intentions to help or harm (see Figure S1). Specifically,
judgments of dominance were unaffected by condition, such
that low contributors were judged to be dominant in both condi-
tions (F[1, 87.63] = 7.40, p = 0.01). The interaction of this effect
with condition was not significant (F[1, 85.69] = 0.40, p = 0.53).
By contrast, judgments of friendliness showed an identical
pattern to liking; high contributors were judged to be friendly
and low contributors were judged to be unfriendly in the
Donation condition (main effect of estimated contribution: F[1,
86.58] = 82.38, p < 0.001), but this effect was significantly
reduced in the Savings condition (interaction: F[1, 84.47] =
21.00, p < 0.001). There were no main effects of condition for
either trait (dominance: F[1, 78.44] = 0.10, p = 0.75, friendliness:
F[1, 79.44] = 1.58, p = 0.21).
This pattern suggests that contributions in both Donation and
Savings conditions had social meaning; participants in both
conditions saw low contributions as indicative of dominance
(i.e., placing individual goals before others’). However, in the
Donation condition only, those contributions also influenced
perceptions of friendliness, an interpersonal dimension identified
with the intention to help or harm others (Fiske et al., 2007).
Brain Activation during Inference Phase
If VMPFC activation integrated others’ objective monetary
outcomes with their intentions to help or harm, the difference
in activation between High and Low inferred contributions
should be larger in the Donation condition (when contributions
influenced player likability and perceptions of friendliness) than
in the Savings condition (when they did not). To test the interac-
tion of inferred contribution and condition, contrast images for514 Neuron 67, 511–521, August 12, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.making High versus Low inferences were calculated within
participants. These contrast images were then compared
between Donation and Savings condition participants in an inde-
pendent-sample t test.
As predicted, VMPFC activation distinguished between High
and Low inferences in the Donation but not the Savings condition
(Figure 3). The comparison revealed a cluster in VMPFC (x / y /
z = 0 / 42 / 8 mm, peak Z = 3.75, extent = 58 voxels,
p = 0.046 corrected), as well as several other regions including
rostromedial prefrontal cortex (RMPFC), right middle temporal
gyrus, and medial precuneus. The reverse interaction activated
only one cluster in medial parietal cortex (Table 2). VMPFC acti-
vation time courses suggested that the interaction was driven
by increased activation for High inferences and decreased acti-
vation for Low inferences in the Donation condition, with little
difference between High and Low inferences in the Savings con-
dition. (See also Table S2 for activations within conditions.)
One important experimental control involved subjective cer-
tainty about inferences, which might also modulate prefrontal
activation (Doya, 2008; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008). A rein-
forcement learning model was fit to each participant’s behavior
to estimate inferential certainty on each trial. After including
regressors for certainty and estimated contribution sum, a
smaller cluster of VMPFC was still activated for the interaction
between inference and condition (see Table S2), suggesting
that VMPFC activation was not due to differences in subjective
certainty between conditions.
We also examined the main effects of inference type (High or
Low) across conditions. High inferences corresponded to oppo-
site monetary outcomes between conditions (high donations or
high savings), as did Low, but both kinds of inferences also
shared several features; for example, High inferences always
corresponded to larger numbers, and were always more consis-
tent with the situational norms. To test the main effects, within-
participant High versus Low contrast images for both conditions
were averaged in a one-sample t test.
Table 2. Activation during Inference Phase (Standard Model)
Region
Peak
Z-Score X Y Z
Cluster
Size (vox)
High > Low (Donation > Savings)
Middle temporal gyrus 4.41 62 24 14 40
Medial precuneus 4.07 14 54 60 17
Ventromedial PFC 3.75 0 42 8 58a
Rostromedial PFC 3.70 4 62 0 12
Thalamus 3.54 8 6 8 12
High > Low (Savings > Donation)
Medial parietal cortex 4.18 8 28 66 13
High > Low (Both Conditions)
Rostromedial PFC 4.03 10 62 18 29
Low > High (Both Conditions)
Dorsolateral PFC 4.17 24 22 46 14
Dorsomedial PFC 4.04 2 18 44 124a
Anterior cingulate 3.69 8 26 36 b
Anterior insula / putamen 3.99 24 22 8 34
Cuneus 3.63 12 78 14 17
Cuneus 3.51 16 68 16 12
Dorsolateral PFC 3.41 40 24 34 13
PFC = prefrontal cortex. Activations in table were thresholded voxelwise
at p < 0.001 and with a cluster size greater than or equal to ten voxels
(whole-brain corrected cluster-size threshold = 57 voxels). T-statistics
were converted to Z-scores for reporting. Coordinates are reported in
MNI/ICBM152 coordinates, as in SPM5. Resampled voxel size was 2 3
2 3 2 mm. See also Table S2 online for activation within conditions.
aCluster size p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons across the
whole brain.
b Subpeaks within a cluster.
Figure 4. Rostromedial and Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex Distin-
guish High and Low Inferences across Conditions
(A) Activation for High versus Low inferences in both conditions.
(B) Activation for Low versus High inferences in both conditions. R indicates
right. Color bar indicates t-statistic for both panels. Activations thresholded
voxelwise at p < 0.001 with a ten-voxel extent minimum for display.
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VMPFC Activation for Others’ IntentionsOnly one area was more active for making High versus Low
inferences in both conditions, a cluster in right rostromedial
PFC (Table 2; Figure 4). Several areas, however, were more
active for Low versus High inferences in both conditions.
These included anterior cingulate (ACC) overlapping dorsal
MPFC (x / y / z = 2 / 18 / 44 mm, peak Z = 4.04, extent = 124
voxels, p < 0.001 corrected), right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), anterior insula, and occipital cortex. Several areas of
medial and lateral frontal cortex, then, encoded the difference
between High and Low inferences identically across conditions,
even though those inferences corresponded to opposite mone-
tary outcomes in different conditions.Brain Activation during Feedback
Since players’ contributions influenced liking in the Donation but
not Savings condition, participants must have updated their
beliefs about participants differently between conditions in
response to observing those contributions. The difference
between conditions in how players updated their beliefs might
be reflected by differential neural activation to observing the
contributions on the trial-by-trial level. Brain areas that were
more engaged for learning about contributions in the Donation
than in the Savings condition might be involved not just in
learning numerical amounts, but specifically in learning or updat-ing beliefs about players’ likability or their intentions to help and
harm.
To examine whether neural responses to learning about
players’ contributions differed between conditions, we exam-
ined activation correlated with inferential errors, which were
estimated by a reinforcement learningmodel that accurately pre-
dicted participants’ actual inferences (see Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures for model details). The model estimated
errors in a participant’s inferred contribution for every player on
every trial (positive for higher-than-expected contributions and
negative for lower-than-expected contributions in both condi-
tions). Imaging regressors then correlated these inferential errors
with trial-by-trial activation when feedback was displayed.
Within-participant contrast images that averaged across error
regressors for all players were constructed; as before, these
contrast images were compared in an independent-sample
t test between Donation and Savings conditions. Greater
contrast values for the Donation than the Savings condition
would indicate (on average) more activation for higher-than-
expected contributions and less activation for lower-than-
expected contributions.
Several regions in fact responded to inferential errors more in
the Donation condition than in the Savings condition (Table 3 and
Figure 5; see also Table S3 for activations within condition). Infer-
ential error activation was greater for the Donation condition in
the right parahippocampal gyrus, left DLPFC, right temporopar-
ietal junction, and cuneus. Inferential error activation was greater
for the Savings condition only in left middle frontal gyrus. These
clustersmet the exploratory cluster-size threshold, but nonewas
large enough to meet the whole-brain corrected threshold.Neuron 67, 511–521, August 12, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 515
Table 3. Activation Correlated with Inferential Errors during
Feedback Phase (Reinforcement Learning Model)
Region
Peak
Z-Score X Y Z
Cluster
Size (vox)
Donation > Savings
Parahippocampal gyrus 4.25 32 38 16 15
Dorsolateral PFC 3.92 40 6 30 11
Cuneus 3.74 4 68 18 28
Temporoparietal junction 3.72 48 74 20 13
Dorsolateral PFC 3.58 20 16 54 15
Savings > Donation
Middle frontal gyrus 4.28 30 22 18 16
Both Conditions (Positive Correlations)
Lateral parietal cortex 4.15 44 24 48 21
Both Conditions (Negative Correlations)
Posterior cingulate 4.04 34 64 12 12
Cuneus 3.80 18 80 24 13
PFC = prefrontal cortex. Activations in table were thresholded voxelwise
at p < 0.001 and with a cluster size greater than or equal to ten voxels
(whole-brain corrected cluster-size threshold = 65 voxels). T-statistics
were converted to Z-scores for reporting. Coordinates are reported in
MNI/ICBM152 coordinates, as in SPM5. Resampled voxel size was 2 3
2 3 2 mm. See also Table S3 online for activation within conditions.
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VMPFC Activation for Others’ IntentionsAveraged across both conditions, inferential errors positively
correlated with activation in right parietal cortex, such that
higher-than-expected contributions increased activation in this
region in both the Donation and Savings conditions (Table 3).
Inferential errors in both conditions correlated negatively with
clusters in posterior cingulate bordering on the parietal cortex
and in occipital cortex. These clusters also met only the explor-
atory cluster-size threshold.
DISCUSSION
When evaluating others’ decisions, people consider both their
outcomes as well as their intentions. To determine how others’
outcomes and intentions were integrated neurally, the current
study examined individuals in two conditions of a novel socialFigure 5. Activation for Inferential Errors between Conditions
Regions where activation for inferential errors averaged across all players was
greater for the Donation than the Savings condition. R indicates right. Color bar
indicates t-statistic. Activations thresholded voxelwise at p < 0.001 with a ten-
voxel extent minimum for display.
516 Neuron 67, 511–521, August 12, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.observation task in separate FMRI and behavioral experiments.
All participants made inferences about the outcomes of players
in a public goods game in which the participant had no personal
stake, and during which the players used strategies ranging from
generous to selfish. Participants in the Donation condition saw
the game in terms of donations that helped or harmed other
people, while participants in the Savings condition saw the
same game in terms of savings that individuals maximized in
a series of risky market investments. The Donation condition
was designed to evoke emotional judgments of players’ inten-
tions to help or harm others, while the Savings condition was
designed to disengage those judgments.
In the VMPFC, a key structure for evaluating personal
outcomes, activation for others’ outcomes was significantly
affected by judgments of their intentions. In the Donation
condition, VMPFC activation increased for high contribution
inferences, which helped the group, and decreased for low
contribution inferences, which harmed the group. In the Savings
condition, however, VMPFC activation did not significantly vary
when participants inferred high versus low contributions.
These findings are consistent with the idea that VMPFC activa-
tion reflects an integrated evaluation that can guide decisions.
In this study, though, these evaluations were solely about others’
outcomes. If VMPFC activation only represented personal
outcomes, this region should not have responded in either
condition, since participants had no monetary stake in the
game and knew they would not interact with the players. If, by
contrast, the VMPFC only simulated others’ objective outcomes
during observation, its activation should not have distinguished
between conditions, as the observed monetary outcomes in
the Savings and Donation conditions were identical. Neither of
these accounts matches the current findings.
Instead, a social preference account suggests that partici-
pants preferred high contributions to low contributions in the
Donation condition, but did not distinguish between them in
the Savings condition. Why would preferences for the same
outcomes differ between conditions? The clearest possibility is
that different descriptions of the public goods game evoked
different emotional judgments of players’ intentions. Reci-
procity-based theories of social preferences suggest that others’
intentions to help or harm others play a key role in determining
a personal response to their outcomes. Typically, those inten-
tions are judged from behavior. For instance, a player who
pursues a ‘‘nice’’ strategy (i.e., donates to the group) is seen as
more likable than one who pursues a ‘‘nasty’’ strategy (i.e., with-
holds donations), and hence rewards for the nice player are
preferred.
This judgment process, however, is not fixed; in this study,
judgments differed across conditions. High and low contribu-
tions only suggested the intention to help or harm others in the
Donation condition, as confirmed by changes in liking and
ratings of friendliness in the Donation but not in the Savings
condition. One possibility is that the framing manipulation
changed the basis for moral evaluation. Low contributors were
always perceived to put the individual before the group (as
confirmed by ratings of dominance in both conditions). In the
Donation condition, when pro-group norms were promoted,
these norm violations were seen as antisocial and unlikable. In
Neuron
VMPFC Activation for Others’ Intentionsthe Savings condition, when pro-individual norms were pro-
moted, low contributions were no longer a violation or an
offense. Antisocial actions that seem justified do not generate
the same level of outrage as the same actions evaluated as spite-
ful or competitive.
One caution about these conclusions is that the VMPFC is
involved in social cognitive processing beyond simple evaluation
of outcome preferences (Adolphs, 2009; Amodio and Frith,
2006). Although the Donation and Savings conditions were
designed to be matched on social cognitive demands as closely
as possible, differences in features of the social context beyond
perceived intentions may also have contributed to differences in
VMPFC activation.
Other regions of themedial PFC encoded different representa-
tions of players’ actions that might correspond with different
kinds of judgments. Rostromedial PFCwasmore active for infer-
ring High in both conditions (at the exploratory cluster threshold),
even thoughHigh inferences corresponded to differentmonetary
outcomes (contributing or saving) across conditions. High infer-
ences, however, were always more consistent with situational
norms, as well as the participants’ own hypothetical donations.
This region has been linked to ‘‘mentalizing,’’ the process of
considering others’ mental states and intentions (Amodio and
Frith, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2005; Walter et al., 2004). In particular,
this region is more active when considering intentions with
clearer explanations, or when judging others who are more
similar to the self (Harris et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2006). Acti-
vation in this region may thus reflect a situational norm for High
inferences across conditions; this norm would provide a clearer
reason for High donations/savings than for Low and may have
led participants to feel more similar to those following the norm.
By contrast, Low inferences in both conditions activated
a network including ACC, DLPFC, and insula. The ACC and
DLPFC especially are involved in response conflicts like over-
riding a prepotent response, as in the Stroop or oddball tasks
(Amodio and Frith, 2006; Barch et al., 2001; Carter et al.,
1998), while the insula has been linked to detecting and process-
ing uncertainty (Platt and Huettel, 2008). Activation of this
network suggests that there was a prepotent response toward
High inferences, an idea supported by the choice bias and
slower reaction times in Low inferences. This interpretation is
again consistent with a situational norm across conditions
toward High and away from Low inferences, regardless of the
monetary outcomes. Low outcomes may have seemed less
likely or desirable due to the condition’s described norms, and
hence inferring Low may have required overriding the ‘‘default’’
prediction about players’ behavior.
Taken together, these results suggest that in more dorsal
MPFC (RMPFC and ACC), neural representations of players’
intentions were relatively less sensitive to their objective mone-
tary outcomes, and more sensitive to whether their behavior
was consistent or inconsistent with the situational norms. Infer-
ring behavior consistent with the condition’s norm activated
mentalizing regions, while inferring inconsistent behavior acti-
vated regions linked to response conflict, even when that norm
objectively reversed between donating and saving.
Neural responses to learning about players’ actual contribu-
tions also varied between conditions. A reinforcement learningmodel was fit to participants’ inferences to estimate their trial-
by-trial learning about how much each player tended to
contribute. Similar models have a long tradition in social psycho-
logical accounts of impression formation (Anderson, 1971;
Kashima and Kerekes, 1994), parallel to but distinct from their
use in studying reward learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998). FMRI
studies of learning about others have found that error terms in
these models correlate with activation in several brain regions
including the striatum, medial PFC, and right temporoparietal
junction (TPJ; Behrens et al., 2008; King-Casas et al., 2005).
Inferential errors were associated with greater activation (posi-
tive and negative) in the right TPJ for participants in the Donation
condition. Right TPJ activation has been associated with judging
others’ intentions in a variety of other social cognitive tasks
(Castelli et al., 2000; Saxe, 2006). Activation in this region
suggests that in the Donation condition, participants saw contri-
butions as more informative about players’ intentions to help or
harm, consistent with the greater effect of contributions on liking
in this condition. Inferential errors in the Donation condition were
also associated with greater activation in the right parahippo-
campal gyrus and left DLPFC, which have been linked to explicit
memory encoding (Gabrieli, 1998;Wagner et al., 1998). Donation
participants learned more about players’ intentions from the
same numerical feedback; that learning may have changed
existing cognitive representations about the players, such as
beliefs about their personality traits. This interpretation is consis-
tent with social psychological models using reinforcement
learning algorithms (Kashima and Kerekes, 1994), in which infer-
ential errors play a similar role to reward prediction errors in
studies of incentive learning, that is, improving existing beliefs
about others’ traits based on feedback.
We did not detect between-condition differences in the stria-
tum; while reward prediction errors have been linked especially
to striatal activation (McClure et al., 2003), inferential errors
(without a personal reward at stake) may instead be associated
with activation in regions that support social learning and
memory like the TPJ and medial temporal lobe. Another possi-
bility is that the study lacked sufficient power to detect
a between-condition difference; in the within-condition results
(see Table S3), putamen activation correlated with inferential
errors in the Donation but not Savings condition, providing spec-
ulative evidence for this possibility. An important qualifier on all of
the inferential error conclusions is that these clusters were acti-
vated only at the exploratory cluster threshold; future research
will be needed to determine how robustly these models account
for brain activation and behavior during learning about others.
These findings extend a growing line of research on how social
contextual factors can modulate neural representations of
others’ outcomes. Others’ outcomes, such as donations to
charity, can activate reward-sensitive regions like the ventral
striatum, even when observers have no personal stake
(Harbaugh et al., 2007). These activations, though, can depend
on emotional judgments of those others. Individuals watching
others receive electric shocks, for example, had reduced activa-
tion in pain-sensitive regions such as the insula and ACC if those
others had played unfairly in a prior economic game (Singer
et al., 2006). In another study, when individuals read about
others’ misfortunes, they had greater activation in the ventralNeuron 67, 511–521, August 12, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 517
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(Takahashi et al., 2009). Contextual modulation can also account
for reactions to others’ decisions and rewards. In one study, in
which participants played economic games with fictional part-
ners given likable, neutral, or unlikable back stories, the ventral
caudate was activated only in response to cooperative decisions
if the partner was unlikable or neutral, but was activated for both
cooperation and noncooperation if the partner was likable
(Delgado et al., 2005). In another study, individuals watching
another player win in a gambling game had greater ventral stria-
tal activation when that player had previously expressed likable
(compared with unlikable) personal traits in a taped interview.
Further, VMPFC activation in response to those wins was modu-
lated by subjective similarity to the player (but not by liking of him
or her; Mobbs et al., 2009).
The current findings suggest that observing others’ outcomes
can activate neural structures that are also recruited by personal
outcomes, such as the VMPFC, and highlight again that this
activity depends upon the social context. Earlier studies, how-
ever, manipulated this context bymanipulating the others’ actual
behavior (e.g., changing whether they had done likable things or
played fairly). This study demonstrates that VMPFC activation is
affected by others’ intentions independent of their actions.
Generous and selfish players made the same contributions in
both conditions. Participants only judged their intentions as
helpful or harmful, however, when contributing was described
in terms of its consequences for the group, and only then did
VMPFC activation vary.
The effect of the task descriptions on liking has implications for
reciprocity-based models of social preference. These models
typically assume individuals automatically judge the ‘‘niceness’’
or ‘‘nastiness’’ of other players, echoing evolutionary accounts of
altruism that rely on knowing others’ past reputations (Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). The current
findings support these accounts, since merely observing others’
contributions in a public goods game can drive formation of
strong preferences. Social liking and disliking can persist well
beyond observation of a single act and can influence unrelated
decisions (Byrne, 1971), and thus the current results imply that
deciding to contribute can have a long-term impact on one’s
reputation. At the same time, the results emphasize that the
judgment of others’ niceness or nastiness is not fixed by their
behavior, but depends on how it is described. The offered price
for a car might seem high when the seller’s high profits are
emphasized, but the seller might highlight the need to pay his
or her staff; similarly, an arbitrator might view a wage offer differ-
ently when it is described as an ‘‘institutional savings measure’’
instead of a ‘‘pay cut.’’ In the current study, a high contributor
might choose to be described as a ‘‘high donator,’’ while a low
contributor might choose the ‘‘high saver’’ description. These
descriptions influence both observers’ judgments and their
neural responses to observing contributions, or failures to
contribute.
In summary, when individuals observed others in an economic
game described in terms of donations to the group, they liked
high contributors and disliked low contributors even when they
had no personal stake in the game. In this Donation condition,
VMPFC activation increased when inferring generous play and518 Neuron 67, 511–521, August 12, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.decreased when inferring selfish play. When participants
observed the same game in a Savings condition that described
play in terms of individual savings, neither VMPFC activation
nor liking changed during inference. Regardless of the objective
outcomes in each condition, rostromedial PFC activation
increased for inferring behavior consistent with the condition’s
norm, while ACC, DLPFC, and insula activation increased for
inconsistent behavior. In addition, inferential errors for observed
contributions recruited brain regions linked to social cognition
and memory (including the TPJ, DLPFC, and parahippocampal
gyrus) in the Donation more than the Savings condition. These
findings are consistent with the idea that in the Donation condi-
tion, individuals perceived contributions as more informative of
others’ intentions to help or harm, and that those intentions
were integrated with the value of others’ outcomes in the
VMPFC. This region may thus play a key role in representing
preferences about others’ outcomes, above and beyond one’s
own. Those preferences, though, depend crucially on the
perceived intentions behind others’ actions.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
In the FMRI study, 38 individuals participated for cash after recruitment online,
20 in the Donation condition (ten women and ten men) and 18 in the Savings
condition (eight women and ten men). Two additional participants, both in
the Savings condition, were not analyzed due to self-reported drowsiness.
FMRI participants were right-handed, fluent English speakers, ethnically
representative of the Stanford community, and between the ages of 18 and
46 (M = 21.34, SEM = 1.01). FMRI participants also had no metal or medical
device implants, no history of neurological or cardiovascular disorder, and
no current psychiatric diagnosis or psychotropic prescriptions.
In the behavioral study, 84 individuals participated for cash after recruitment
online, 42 in the Donation condition (25 women and 17 men) and 42 in the
Savings condition (22 women and 20men). Behavioral participants were fluent
English speakers, ethnically representative of the Stanford community, and
between the ages of 18 and 40 (M = 20.48, SEM = 0.35). All participants
gave informed consent for a protocol approved by the Institutional Review
Board of the Stanford University School of Medicine.
Materials and Setting
Two sets of target faces were used in the FMRI study, one each in the Donation
and Savings conditions; two faces overlapped between sets. Target faces
were drawn from the Productive Aging Laboratory Face Database (Minear
and Park, 2004). Two sets of target faces drawn from the same database
were also used in the behavioral study, one all-male and one all-female. Target
gender was counterbalanced across conditions but was not analyzed in this
study. All target faces were European-American, between 18 and 25, and
had neutral expressions. All photos were of the full face in color on a gray back-
ground, cropped to 120 3 140 pixels. No rating differences were found
between sets prior to the study. Scanning was conducted at the Richard
M. Lucas Center for Imaging (Stanford, CA). Stimuli were projected using
E-Prime 1.1 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA).
FMRI Study Experimental Design and Task
Before Task
After informed consent, each participant was told he or she was going to make
predictions about the outcomes of an economic game from an earlier experi-
ment. Before further instructions, participants were left alone to fill out judg-
ment questionnaires for each player, each with that player’s face and the liking
scale. Liking was measured with the two-item version of the Interpersonal
Judgment Scale (Byrne, 1971). Item 1 asked ‘‘How much do you think you
would like this person’’? Item 2 asked ‘‘How much would you like to work
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very much, at 5 by neither like nor dislike, and at 9 by like very much.
The Observed Public Goods Game
With the experimenter, participants then read a series of instructions
describing the observed game, a six-person repeated public goods game
(Ledyard, 1995). On each round of the game, four of the six players are
selected to play while the other two sit out. Those four are each given $10
and asked to decide how much to contribute to a common investment (from
$0 to $10 in whole dollars). None of the players know who else has been
selected to play on that round or howmuch they contribute. The experimenter
then doubles the common investment and splits it into four equal shares. Each
player then receives one share, plus any amount she did not contribute, into
her bank account. High contributions thus improve group outcomes, because
more money is doubled and split, but low contributions improve individual
outcomes, providing an incentive for each individual to not contribute.
After the description, participants played four practice rounds of the public
goods game as players and reviewed two further examples to ensure
they understood the payoffs. Players were tested identically in both condi-
tions, to make certain the understanding of payoffs did not differ between
conditions.
The Task
Participants then read a set of instructions describing their inference task
(Figure 1). Each trial had three phases. First (the face phase, 8 s), the players
on that round appeared. Faces appeared individually from left to right every
2 s and remained on screen for the rest of the trial. Second (the inference
phase, 3–5 s), the words ‘‘High’’ and ‘‘Low’’ appeared on screen. The partici-
pant inferred High if she believed the four players together contributed $20 or
more to the common investment on that round, and Low otherwise. Inferences
weremade using a button box held in the right hand. The side of the screen (left
or right) and associated button for each option was counterbalanced randomly
between trials. Participants had 3 s to infer, followed by a jitter delay of 0, 1, or
2 s (equal numbers of trials for each delay, ordered randomly). Finally (the feed-
back phase, 5 s), each player’s actual contribution appeared, as did the total
amount and the actual group outcome (the word ‘‘High’’ or ‘‘Low,’’ in green
for correct or red for incorrect). The feedback phase was followed by a fixation
cross of 2–4 s to make each trial’s length 20 s.
Participants were told the rounds they saw were not presented in their orig-
inal order from the earlier experiment, but were randomly ordered to prevent
them from tracking sequences of contributions. The instructions asked partic-
ipants to learn each player’s average contribution level and use that level to
make inferences. Participants then played three practice trials with cartoon
faces and asked any questions before entering the scanner.
The task included 60 trials. Each possible combination of players appeared
an equal number of times; each player therefore appeared 40 times. The
primary manipulation was average contribution level. Each player’s contribu-
tions were predesigned so that the six players ranged from highly generous
to highly selfish. Each player made contributions within a $3 range (12 trials
at each of three values) for 90% of their appearances (36 of 40 trials); the
remaining 10% of contributions for each player were random amounts outside
of the player’s range to increase plausibility. The ranges were $10–$8, $9–$7,
$7–$5, $5–$3, $3–$1, and $2–$0. For example, the highest contributor
gave $10, $9, and $8 12 times each, and a random amount between $0 and
$7 four times. The order of all contributions was randomized for every partic-
ipant. About half of each participant’s trials were High (mean High trials in
Donation = 52.50%, SEM = 0.70%; mean High trials in Savings = 53.43%,
SEM = 0.71%). Face photos were randomly assigned to players across
participants.
Donation and Savings Conditions
In the Donation condition, instructions emphasized group outcomes for the
public goods game and described high contributions as positive. For example,
contributions were called ‘‘donations’’ throughout; participants were also told
the game is called ‘‘the Public Goods Game,’’ that ‘‘donating to the common
investment improved how every other player did on that round,’’ and that the
game is used ‘‘to study charitable donation behavior and how people invest
in public goods like parks and schools.’’ As well, all inferences and feedback
during the instructions and task were shown in terms of contributions (i.e.,
the amount a player gave to the common investment.)The Savings condition differed from the Donation condition in two ways.
First, the instructions emphasized individual outcomes, and highlighted both
the risk of contributing and the safety of not contributing. Participants were
told the game was called ‘‘the Stock Market Game,’’ that ‘‘investing is risky,’’
that ‘‘the optimal decision is to save $10,’’ and that the game is used ‘‘to study
risk-taking behavior in markets and compulsive gambling.’’ Second, infer-
ences and feedback during the instructions and the task were shown not in
terms of contributions, but rather in terms of savings (i.e., the amount a player
kept for herself). For example, an $8 contribution was shown as $8 in the Dona-
tion condition, but as $2 in the Savings condition. The terms ‘‘saving’’ and ‘‘not
saving’’ substituted for ‘‘not donating’’ and ‘‘donating’’ throughout the instruc-
tions. During the task, Savings participants inferred group savings, instead of
contributions, on each trial; participants inferred High if they believed the four
players together saved $20 or more, and Low otherwise. Feedback was then
shown as savings amounts (instead of contributions) for that trial. All other
details were identical to the Donation condition.
After Inference Task
Participants completed identical player judgment questionnaires in a waiting
room. The final packet also asked participants to estimate the average amount
each player contributed (in the Donation condition) or saved (in the Savings
condition) in a single round. It also asked how much participants would have
contributed themselves (in the Donation condition) or saved themselves
(in the Savings condition) on average in a single round if they had been a player.
Afterward, they were thanked and fully debriefed about the origins of the
contributions and the aims of the study. Participation took about 90 min,
and each participant was paid $40 in cash.
Imaging
Participants were scanned with a General Electric 1.5 T Signa scanner using
the standard head coil, with a bite bar and padding to minimize head motion.
Functional images covered the whole brain with 24 contiguous 4 mm thick
axial slices (TR = 2 s, TE = 40 ms, flip = 90, 3.75 3 3.75 mm in-plane voxel
size, 64 3 64 matrix), collected using a T2*-sensitive spiral in/out pulse
sequence that minimizes dropout in ventral frontal regions (Glover and Law,
2001; Preston et al., 2004). Each participant’s functional run consisted of
606 images; the first three were then discarded to account for magnetic equil-
ibration. Shimming was performed immediately before the functional run with
custom software. An in-plane structural image was acquired before the shim
(24 contiguous 4 mm thick axial slices; TR = 14 ms; TR = 400 ms, 0.94 3
0.94 mm in-plane resolution, 256 3 256 matrix), and a high-resolution struc-
tural was acquired after the functional run (3D acquisition; T1-weighted
SPGR sequence; 0.86 3 0.86 3 1.5 mm voxel size; 256 3 256 3 116 matrix).
Behavioral Study Experimental Design and Task
Behavioral participants performed a nearly identical task. The observed public
goods game and contribution levels, inference task (including number of trials),
and framing manipulation between Donation and Savings conditions were all
identical to the FMRI study. Task timing was identical, except that the faces
appeared all at once instead of over 8 s, and the inference phase was self-
paced. Participation took about 60 min, and each participant was paid $12
in cash.
The key difference between FMRI and behavioral studies was in the player
judgment questionnaires before and after the task. Participants again rated
liking with the two-item Interpersonal Judgment Scale, but they also rated
players on eight interpersonal adjectives spanning the interpersonal circum-
plex (e.g., assertive, antisocial; Knutson, 1996; Wiggins, 1979). These ratings
were combined to create pre- and posttask ratings of dominance and friend-
liness that were then analyzed identically to liking (see Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures for details).
Statistical Analysis
Inferences were analyzed using repeated-measures ANOVA and post hoc
t tests in SPSS 17.0 (SPSS, Inc. Chicago, IL). Reaction time was log-trans-
formed before testing to correct for its skewed distribution. Liking, estimated
contributions, and interpersonal ratings were analyzed with mixed linear
models (MLM) using the MIXED command, treating players as the lower-level
unit within participants. Models were estimated using maximum likelihood andNeuron 67, 511–521, August 12, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 519
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and examined for approximate normality. The two liking items were averaged
together for all analyses (a = 0.79). Liking and interpersonal ratings were
analyzed as changes from before to after the task, with initial ratings included
in the model as a covariate. All tests were two-tailed.
Imaging data were analyzed with SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, London), using standard spatial preprocessing (slice timing
correction, realignment, normalization, and spatial smoothing; see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures for details). Two different models of experi-
mental effects were used (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for
details). The ‘‘standard model’’ examined experimental events across condi-
tions, with separate regressors for High and Low inferences crossed with
subsequently correct or incorrect inferences. The ‘‘reinforcement learning
model’’ used the output of a reinforcement learning algorithm to create regres-
sors for each participant’s trial-by-trial estimate of the average contribution
level for each player on each trial, as well as player-specific inferential errors
on each trial. Inferential errors were calculated as the difference between
actual contribution and estimated contribution level (i.e., increasing with actual
contribution, decreasing with estimated contribution level). All regressors of
interest were convolved with the SPM5 canonical hemodynamic response
function. Six regressors modeling residual head motion (x, y, z, pitch, roll,
and yaw) and a constant term were also included.
Models were estimated using restricted maximum likelihood and an AR(1)
model for temporal autocorrelation. A high-pass filter (cutoff 90 s) removed
low-frequency noise. Beta-weight images for each regressor were combined
to form appropriate contrast images for each within-participant comparison
(e.g., High versus Low). Between-condition comparisons (e.g., Donation
versus Savings) were then made with independent-sample t tests on within-
participant contrasts. Peak activations are reported in MNI coordinates, as
in SPM5.
Activations were thresholded voxelwise at p < 0.001. Family-wise error
correction for multiple comparisons across the whole brain at p < 0.05 was
achieved by using a cluster-size threshold estimated for each contrast using
Gaussian random field theory (as standard in SPM5; Worsley et al., 1996).
Cluster-size thresholds for the contrasts reported ranged from 41 to 65 voxels
(noted in tables). As this correction tends to be conservative, we also report all
activations above the exploratory cluster-size threshold of ten voxels (Lieber-
man and Cunningham, 2009).
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Experimental Procedures, references, one
figure, and three tables and can be found online at doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.
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